	Approved For Release 2009/05/04 : CIA-RDP83M00914R000300010022-8						
	ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET						
	SUBJECT: (Optional)	Review Completed.					
	FROM Walter Elder Executive Secretary, NFIB			NO. IC/82/3312 DATE 21 January 1982	25X1 STA		
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NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD

82-2170

IC/82/3311 21 January 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, National Intelligence Council

FROM

Walter Elder

Executive Secretary

SUBJECT

: PFIAB Request: National Intelligence Estimates (1981)

- 1. Fred Demech requests a copy of each of the estimates listed in the attachment.
- 2. For the record, please, drop me a note when you've dealt with this request.

WALTER	ELDER

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ec: Executive Director, CIA

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DECL' REVW ON January 1987
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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES (1981)

The Senior Review Panel (comprised of was asked to compare National Intelligence was asked to compare National Intelligence Estimates during the first three quarters of 1981 with those during 1979 and 1980 in relevance, tempo and quality. They reported that in 1979-80 there was substantially less use of the Community and a dearth of interagency estimates directly pointed to critical policy issues in the manner followed since the late spring of this year under revised NIC procedures. Timeliness of intelligence advice and rapidity of response time has much improved in 1981. Design of analysis/estimatesin content shaped more closely to specific policy problems and in forms more useful to policymakershas also been significantly enhanced.	
Finally, in 1979-80, there was substantial evidence of capacity for pertinent anticipatory analysis going unused because of insufficient linkage between the policy and the intelligence communities. Some of these cases later developed into major policy issues involving instability in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and Central America. Our impression is that, in 1981, performance in converting perceptive basic studies in NFAC into effective inputs for policymakers has been materially improved.	
50 KEY INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES (March 1981-January 15, 1982)	

